Almost every incident worth writing about starts with something that was working exactly as designed. The design was just describing a different world than the one the system ended up in.
This piece walks through how we think about it at Paycux, what we have changed our minds about, and where the sharp edges are.
The history of authentication: where it all began
That brings us to the history of authentication: where it all began. Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
1961: Passwords
That brings us to 1961: passwords. Detection beats prevention when prevention is uncertain. If you cannot stop a class of abuse outright, make sure it produces a signal loud enough that someone sees it the same day.
Blast radius is the metric that actually matters. A credential that can read one organization's data is an incident; the same credential scoped to every organization is a company-ending event, and the difference is a design decision made months earlier.
- Scope credentials to the smallest useful blast radius
- Alert on the abuse you cannot prevent
- Exercise the rotation path before you need it
- Log the decision, not just the outcome
Late 1960s: Password encryption
Late 1960s: Password encryption deserves its own treatment. Blast radius is the metric that actually matters. A credential that can read one organization's data is an incident; the same credential scoped to every organization is a company-ending event, and the difference is a design decision made months earlier.
Detection beats prevention when prevention is uncertain. If you cannot stop a class of abuse outright, make sure it produces a signal loud enough that someone sees it the same day.
Early 1970s: Asymmetric Cryptography
That brings us to early 1970s: asymmetric cryptography. Detection beats prevention when prevention is uncertain. If you cannot stop a class of abuse outright, make sure it produces a signal loud enough that someone sees it the same day.
Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
Blast radius is the metric that actually matters.
Mid-1980s: Dynamic Passwords
Consider mid-1980s: dynamic passwords. Detection beats prevention when prevention is uncertain. If you cannot stop a class of abuse outright, make sure it produces a signal loud enough that someone sees it the same day.
Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
Late 1990s: Public Key Infrastructure
Late 1990s: Public Key Infrastructure is where this gets concrete. Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
2000s: Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Single Sign-on (SSO)
That brings us to 2000s: multi-factor authentication (mfa) and single sign-on (sso). Rotate on a schedule, not on an incident. A rotation path that has been exercised is a routine change; one that has never been used is an outage waiting for the worst possible moment.
Detection beats prevention when prevention is uncertain. If you cannot stop a class of abuse outright, make sure it produces a signal loud enough that someone sees it the same day.
Where this leaves us
The pattern repeats across every system we have looked at: the hard part is not the mechanism, it is keeping the mechanism honest as the surrounding assumptions change.
If you are working through the same problem and want to compare notes, the docs cover the mechanics and the console shows the behaviour on your own data.
Everything here, already built
Sign-in, enterprise SSO, directory provisioning, roles and an audit trail behind one API. Start with the quickstart and have a working sign-in this afternoon.