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Artificial intelligence4 min read

MCP, ACP, A2A, Oh my!

Most of the difficulty with agents is not the model.

Most of the difficulty with agents is not the model. It is that an agent sits between a user and a system that was designed on the assumption a user would be there in person.

This piece walks through how we think about it at Paycux, what we have changed our minds about, and where the sharp edges are.

Key protocol differences at a glance

Key protocol differences at a glance is where this gets concrete. Consent is the part most implementations get wrong. Asking once at install time and then acting indefinitely is not consent; it is a standing grant with no expiry and no visibility.

Consent is the part most implementations get wrong. Asking once at install time and then acting indefinitely is not consent; it is a standing grant with no expiry and no visibility.

Model Context Protocol (MCP)

That brings us to model context protocol (mcp). An agent's credential should describe what it may do, not who owns it. Scope it to the narrowest set of operations that make the task possible, bind it to a single principal, and give it a lifetime measured in minutes rather than days.

The audit trail matters more here than in any human flow. When something goes wrong, the question is never "did the user intend this" in the abstract — it is which agent, acting under whose authority, made which call, and whether the record can prove it.

  • Scope every agent credential to one principal and one task
  • Give tokens minutes of life, not days
  • Record which agent acted, under whose authority, on what
  • Make revocation a single call that takes effect immediately

Primary goal

Primary goal is where this gets concrete. Consent is the part most implementations get wrong. Asking once at install time and then acting indefinitely is not consent; it is a standing grant with no expiry and no visibility.

The audit trail matters more here than in any human flow. When something goes wrong, the question is never "did the user intend this" in the abstract — it is which agent, acting under whose authority, made which call, and whether the record can prove it.

Core elements

That brings us to core elements. An agent's credential should describe what it may do, not who owns it. Scope it to the narrowest set of operations that make the task possible, bind it to a single principal, and give it a lifetime measured in minutes rather than days.

The audit trail matters more here than in any human flow. When something goes wrong, the question is never "did the user intend this" in the abstract — it is which agent, acting under whose authority, made which call, and whether the record can prove it.

Consent is the part most implementations get wrong.

Agent Communication Protocol (ACP)

Consider agent communication protocol (acp). Consent is the part most implementations get wrong. Asking once at install time and then acting indefinitely is not consent; it is a standing grant with no expiry and no visibility.

The audit trail matters more here than in any human flow. When something goes wrong, the question is never "did the user intend this" in the abstract — it is which agent, acting under whose authority, made which call, and whether the record can prove it.

Relationship to MCP

That brings us to relationship to mcp. The audit trail matters more here than in any human flow. When something goes wrong, the question is never "did the user intend this" in the abstract — it is which agent, acting under whose authority, made which call, and whether the record can prove it.

An agent's credential should describe what it may do, not who owns it. Scope it to the narrowest set of operations that make the task possible, bind it to a single principal, and give it a lifetime measured in minutes rather than days.

Pre-alpha stage and community focus

Consider pre-alpha stage and community focus. An agent's credential should describe what it may do, not who owns it. Scope it to the narrowest set of operations that make the task possible, bind it to a single principal, and give it a lifetime measured in minutes rather than days.

Consent is the part most implementations get wrong. Asking once at install time and then acting indefinitely is not consent; it is a standing grant with no expiry and no visibility.

Where this leaves us

If there is one thing worth taking away, it is that the expensive decisions are the ones made implicitly. Making them on purpose costs an afternoon.

If you are working through the same problem and want to compare notes, the docs cover the mechanics and the console shows the behaviour on your own data.

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